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NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal raises the issue whether, where a
construction company employee sues a railroad alleging
injuries to himself as a passenger in his employerfs truck
when it was driven by a co-employee into the side of a train
at a grade crossing, the railroad by third-party complaint
may enforce a right of indemnity against the employer for
negligence of the co-employee, or whether the ordinary right
of indemnity among tortfeasors is barred if the employer has
paid workmenfs compensation to the plaintiff employee.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third District Court, Honorable Ernest Baldwin,
Jr a , determined that a third-party complaint is barred in
such circumstances, and granted the employer's Motion for
Summary Judgment on the railroad's Third-Party Complaint.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The present appeal seeks reversal of the ruling of
the Third District Court, and an order reinstating the ThirdParty Complaint.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Complaint alleges that on August 21, 1973, a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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i
truck in which plaintiff was a passenger was struck by a
train operated by defendant railroad at the 90th South
Street crossing in Salt Lake City, and that plaintiff was
injured.

Plaintiff alleges, and defendants deny, that the

collision was caused by negligent operation of the train
and failure of crossing signals to work.

Plaintiff concedes

that the truck belonged to plaintiff's employer, defendantrespondent DeWayne Construction Company, and was driven by
a co-employee, and that plaintiff and his co-employee were
then on the employer's business.
'

Plaintiff further concedes

that the truck struck the side of the train approximately 80
feet back from the front of the engine, that it was a clear
day and there was an unobstructed view of the crossing for
a substantial distance, that the road and the truck were in
good condition, and that plaintiff has no personal knowledge
whether train and crossing signals operated properly.

State-

ments taken from different witnesses, and from the same
witnesses at different times, indicate some conflict regarding
whether all of the crossing signals were operating, and
whether the train blew its whistle.

Plaintiff has collected

$6,599.89 in workmen's compensation from his employer,
defendant-respondent DeWayne Construction Company.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The driver

of the truck died.

His representative has not been joined

in this action.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DEFENDANT RAILROAD HAS A RIGHT TO HAVE DETERMINED
THE JOINT LIABILITY, IF ANY, OF PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYER,
AND A RIGHT TO INDEMNITY THEREFOR.
Defendant railroad asserts that it was not in any
manner negligent in this case, and is not liable to plaintiff
for any injuries sustained.

Given the conceded facts, it

appears that the collision involved was proximately caused
by the negligence of defendant-respondent's employee driver
in the course of defendant-respondent's business.

While it

seems unlikely to defendant railroad that a jury would find
that the collision was due to negligence, without also finding
that a substantial part of such negligence was imputable to
defendant-respondent, it is possible that jury would accord
a part of such negligence to defendant railroad.

In short,

it appears that if the collision alleged by plaintiff was due
to negligence, defendant railroad is at most a joint tortfeasor with defendant-respondent.
The right of contribution and indemnity exists

-4-
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between joint tortfeasors in Utah.

In order for one joint

tortfeasor to assert such rights against another, of course,
it is necessary to join the other and have the relative
liabilities determined.
Section 78-27-39, UTAH CODE ANN., provides:
"The right of contribution shall exist among
joint tort-feasors, but a joint tort-feasor shall
not be entitled to a money judgment for contribution
until he has, by payment, discharged the common
liability or more than his prorata share thereof.11
Section 78-27-41, UTAH CODE ANN., provides:
"Nothing in this act shall affect:
(1) The common-law liability of the several
joint tort-feasors to have judgment recovered, and
payment made, from them individually by the injured
person for the whole injury. However, the recovery
of a judgment by the injured person against one
joint tort-feasor does not discharge the other joint
tort-feasors.
(2) Any right of indemnity which may exist
under present law.
(3) Any right to contribution or indemnity
arising from contract or agreement."
Section 78-27-42, UTAH CODE ANN., provides:
"A release by the injured person of one joint
tort-feasor, whether before or after judgment,
does not discharge the other tort-feasors, unless
the release so provides, but reduces the claim
against the other tort-feasors by the greater of:
(1) The amount of the consideration paid for that
release; or (2) the amount or proportion by which
the release provides that the total claim shall
be reduced.11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Section 78-27-43, UTAH CODE ANN., provides:
"A release by the injured person of one joint
tort-feasor does not relieve him from liability to
make contribution to another joint tort-feasor
unless that release:
(a) Is given before the right of the other
tort-feasor to secure a money judgment for contribution has accrued; and
(b) Provides for a reduction, to the extent
of the prorata share of the released tort-feasor,
of the injured person1s damages recoverable against
the other tort-feasors.ff
"This section shall apply only if the issue
of proportionate fault is litigated between joint
tort-feasors in the same action.11
It is clear that, unless there is an exception
to the rule because defendant-respondent has paid workmen's
compensation, defendant-respondent is subject to a thirdparty action by defendant railroad to determine the proportionate fault of the parties for any injury to plaintiff.

POINT II.
THE RIGHTS OF CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY BETWEEN
JOINT TORTFEASORS ARE INDEPENDENT, AND NOT DERIVATIVE OF ANY RIGHT OF THE PLAINTIFF AGAINST ANY
TORTFEASOR INDIVIDUALLY.
The rights of contribution and indemnity between
joint tortfeasors in Utah are independent of the rights of
the injured party against either tortfeasor.
78-27-41, 78-27-43 U.C.A. (1953).

For example, where the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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See §§ 78-27-39,

injured party releases a first joint tortfeasor and has no
further rights against him, the second tortfeasor would still
have a right of contribution from the released joint tortfeasor, unless the release also covered the second tortfeasor.
Id.

The Utah law provides that one joint tortfeasor required

to pay more than his proportionate share of a judgment shall
have an independent claim for contribution or indemnity
against a second joint tortfeasor, notwithstanding the plaintiff has no further claim against the second tortfeasor.

The

party seeking contribution in such a case clearly is not
seeking to enforce any right of the plaintiff, but is enforcing his own right not to have to bear more than his
previously determined share of the judgment.

The right to

contribution or indemnity is individual and not derivative
of any right of the plaintiff.

POINT III.
IF THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT IS BARRED, DEFENDANT
RAILROAD IS DEPRIVED OF THE RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION
AND INDEMNITY.
If defendant-respondent is not subject to suit by
defendant railroad, obviously defendant railroad loses any
right of contribution and indemnity against defendantrespondent, notwithstanding it should appear that the vast
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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bulk of negligence in the case was imputable to defendantrespondent.

Thus, defendant railroad, or defendant Harmon

Electronics, might be found to have been merely passively
negligent in some minor degree, and yet be required to bear
the entire judgment.

In such a case, moreover, defendant-

respondent apparently would have a right, under Section 351-62, Utah Code Ann. (1953), to recoup out of any judgment
collected the amount of workmen's compensation paid.

In

short, while it might reasonably appear that defendantrespondent was almost entirely at fault in the matter,
defendant-respondent would escape any liability whatever,
and the entire burden of defendant-respondent's fault would
be cast upon the remaining defendants.
It is realized that occasionally it is unavoidable
that a single joint tortfeasor is required to bear the entire
burden of a judgment, as, for example, where the identity of
the other tortfeasor is not discoverable, or where he is not
subject to process.

Plaintiff in such cases is permitted to

take judgment against the one available joint tortfeasor, and
the result is said not to offend traditional notions of
justice and fairness because the liability of each joint tortfeasor to the injured party is said to be whole and entire,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and because it is thought better that the party at least
partially at fault should have to bear the entire judgment
than that plaintiff should lose his right to be made whole.
Such a rationale of necessity, however, has no applicability
where all of the possible parties at fault are well known
and where all are readily subject to process.

In such a

case, the fact that the plaintiff's entire right may be
enforced by joining a single joint tortfeasor, will not
excuse refusal to enforce the party tortfeasor's rights
against non-party joint tortfeasors by joining them.
It may also be pointed out that in the present
case, failure to join the defendant-respondent may not only
result in an unfair judgment, but creates a risk of an unfair
trial.

Where a dramatic collision and serious injuries have

occurred, and an action is permitted to proceed without the
parties at fault, a predictable desire to redress a dramatically-demonstrated harm may create pressure to fix a doubtful
liability upon an available defendant.
POINT IV.
THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT AFFECTS THE RIGHTS
OF EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYER, INTER SE, BUT NOT THE
RIGHTS OF JOINT TORTFEASORS INTER SE.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Defendant-respondent claims that payment of workmen's compensation to plaintiff relieves it of any further
liability in this matter, and bars the Third-Party Complaint
against it by defendant railroad.

Defendant-respondent's

claim is based upon Section 35-1-60, Utah Code Ann. (1953),
which provides:
"The right to recover compensation pursuant to
the provisions of this title for injuries sustained
by an employee, whether resulting in death or not,
shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer
and shall be the exclusive remedy against any officer,
agent or employee of the employer and the liabilities
of the employer imposed by this act shall be in place
of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at
common law or otherwise, to such employee or to his
spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next
of kin, heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or
any other person whomsoever, on account of any accident
or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained,
aggravated or incurred by such employee in the course
of or because of or arising out of his employment, and
no action at law may be maintained against an employer
or against any officer, agent or employee of the
employer based upon any accident, injury or death of
an employee. Nothing in this section, however, shall
prevent an employee (or his dependents) from filing
a claim with the industrial commission of Utah for
compensation in those cases within the provisions
of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Act, as
amended.11
In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment,
defendant-respondent urged below, (1) that the Utah Workmen's
Compensation Act provides that compensation thereunder shall

-10-
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be the exclusive remedy against an employer for an injury
to an employee, and (2) that such employerfs immunity is
not affected by new Utah statutes providing a right of contribution between joint tortfeasors, since an employer cannot
be a joint tortfeasor within the meaning of those statutes.
While it appears that courts of other jurisdictions might
agree with defendant-respondent, there appear to be no Utah
cases.
It may be pointed out with regard to cases from
other jurisdictions which appear to support defendantrespondent's view, that in the main enactment of workmenTs
compensation in those jurisdictions antedates recognition
of a right of contribution among joint tortfeasors, and for
that reason the usual workmen's compensation law limitation
of actions against employers is considered a condition upon
the right of contribution among joint tortfeasors.

The

history is exactly reversed in Utah -- the right of contribution antedates the Workmen's Compensation Act -- and the
reverse conclusion is justified that the right of contribution
is outside the limitation of actions contained in the Act.
Described broadly, the Workmen's Compensation Act
provides an employee, in case of a work-related injury, a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
OCR, may
contain .•
errors.
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sure and speedy, though limited, award, in exchange for a
release of all other claims against the employer based on
that injury.

The employee gives up his common law rights of

action, but is free in exchange from the uncertainty, expense
and delay attendant upon enforcing such causes of action.

It

is this exchange of one valuable right for another which makes
workmen's compensation constitutional.

Nothing in this basic

scheme suggests that it is intended as a device for shifting
liability for an employer's negligence entirely onto the
shoulders of third persons t\ho may be responsible for some
minimal negligence in the matter.

Nothing in the Act suggests

an intent that an employee who has once obtained the benefits
of a workmen's compensation award and given up all claims
against the employer, should then be able to obtain from
third persons full compensation for injuries caused by the
employer's negligence.

The Act, however, plainly has both

those effects if construed as urged by defendant-respondent.
No doubt the Workmen's Compensation Act intends
that once workmen's compensation is paid the employer shall
be free from liability to, or suit by, the employee, or
anyone claiming through or under him.
Utah Code Ann. (1953).

See Section 35-1-60,

It does not follow that the Act

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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attempts to settle rights arising in the matter between the
employer and third persons not claiming through or under
the injured employee —

such as the right of one joint tort-

feasor to have contribution or indemnity from another.
Recovery on such a third-party right is not the recovery of
the injured employee or of one standing in his shoes, but
of the third party injured by an excess recovery against hira*
Defendant-respondent has urged, however, that under
the Utah Tort-feasorfs Contribution Act, no right of contribution arises between two joint tortfeasors where one is
the employer of the injured party.

It is claimed that the

employer cannot be a joint tortfeasor within the definition
provided by Section 78-27-40, Utah Code Ann. (1953), because
an employer cannot be "jointly or severally liable in tort
for the same injury":

since an employer's liability to an

employee is only the statutory one under the Workmen's Compensation Act, it cannot be joint or several with the liability of a third person in tort.

The definition of "joint

tortfeasor" in Section 78-27-40, however, is specifically
the definition "as used in this section" only.

Nothing in

the remainder of the Act indicates that the term "joint tortfeasors" as used there has not the more common meaning of two
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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or more persons whose actions jointly contribute to the
causing of an injury.

Indeed, the fact that the Section 78-

27-40 definition is specifically identified as the definition
"as used in this section11 should be taken to indicate that
the definition elsewhere in the Act is the more common one.
The Tort-feasor's Contribution Act deals with the
rights inter se of persons obligated to the same third person
for the same tort.

Nothing in the Act suggests that it has

no application where the liability on one side is not the
full-fledged common law liability but a statutory substitute
therefore.

Unless one of the responsible persons is wholly

immune, as, for example, where sovereignty is asserted, the
Contribution

Act applies.

It is not true that an employer

cannot be a tortfeasor against his employee; it is only true
that the employee cannot recover the normal common law
measure of damages in such a case.

So long as the law

requires that the employer make some remuneration for his
responsibility to his employee, nothing suggests that he
should be relieved entirely of his responsibility to joint
tortfeasors.
POINT V.
BOTH THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT AND THE TORTFEASOR'S CONTRIBUTION ACT CAN BE APPLIED WITH
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

FAIRNESS TO ALL PARTIES.
It is clearly the law of. Utah, embodied in recentlyenacted statutes (Sections 78-27-39 through 78-27-43, Utah
Code Ann. (1953) (Supp. 1973)), that there shall be a right
of indemnity or contribution among joint tortfeasors.
Under those statutes, one joint tortfeasor may not escape a
duty to contribute to or indemnify another merely because
he has been released by and escaped liability to the injured
party.

The fact that one joint tortfeasor has paid something

to the injured party does not release his responsibility to
another joint tortfeasor, unless the second tortfeasor is
also released from responsibility to the injured party.

The

new Tort-feasor's Contribution Act contains no exceptions
where an employer is among the tortfeasors or where the previous payment to the injured party is workmenfs compensation.
In order to find such an exception, it would need to be
clear and unambiguous.

Defendant-respondent and the court

below purport to find such an exception in the Workmen's Compensation Act.

The relied-upon section of that Act (Section

35-1-60, Utah Code Ann. (1953)), however, applies only to
claims by or on behalf of injured employees.

It has no

reference, specifically or impliedly, to a third party right

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law• •Library,
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of indemnity, and can have no reference to a right of contribution among joint tortfeasors which did not exist in Utah at
the time of passage of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Defendant-respondent proposes that the Workmen's
Compensation Act be applied to dispose of the claims of both
plaintiff and defendant railroad against defendant-respondent
arising out of the subject collision.

The Act, however, has

no specific application to defendant railroad's claim for
contribution and indemnity.

Moreoever, applying the Act to

release defendant-respondent from the claims for contribution
has the effect not of disposing of plaintiff's claim against
his employer, but instead of shifting the burden of that
claim to the defendant railroad.

A fairer resolution, which

offends neither the Workmen's Compensation Act nor the Tortfeasor's Contribution Act would be to enforce both the right
of defendant-respondent to be released from any further
liability in the matter, and the right of defendant railroad
not to be burdened with any greater liability than is represented by its share of negligence in the matter.

This result

could be achieved by ordering that defendant-respondent shall
remain a defendant for the purpose of determining its percentage of negligence in the matter, but providing that proof of

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the payment of workmen's compensation according to law shall
operate to discharge that percentage of any total judgment.
The release for payment of workmen's compensation would then
inure to the benefit of all defendants, the remaining defendants being required to satisfy only the remaining percentage of the judgment according to their respective percentages
of negligence.

Under the theory of the Workmen's Compensa-

tion Act, plaintiff cannot be hurt by any of this, since he
has already gained the corresponding benefits of the Act.

CONCLUSION
The order of the Third District Court granting
summary judgment to defendant-respondent DeWayne Construction
Company should be reversed, and the case should be remanded
to the district court with instructions that DeWayne Construction Company shall remain a defendant for the purpose of
determining its percentage of negligence, if any, in causing
plaintiff's injuries; provided, however, that proof of
payment by DeWayne Construction Company of workmen's compensation according to law shall satisfy and release as against
all defendants that percentage of any judgment.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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